Determinants of economic growth in BRIC countries by Rajjev K. Goel
Institute for Advanced Development Studies  
 
 






The  views  expressed  in  the  Development  Research  Working  Paper  Series  are  those  of  the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Advanced Development Studies. 
Copyrights belong to the authors. Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. 
 
05/2011 
DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRIC COUNTRIES 
by:  




Rajeev K. Goel * 
Illinois State University 
 
Iikka Korhonen  
Bank of Finland  
 
 
Keywords: Economic growth; BRIC countries; Exports; Institutions; Corruption; World 
 
 
JEL classification codes: O40; O57; P52 
 
 




* Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61790-4200, USA; 
rkgoel@ilstu.edu.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at Bank of Finland’s International Conference on 
Long-term Growth Potential of Russia and China and at INESAD, Bolivia.  We would like to thank Vladimir 
Miklashevsky for help with data collection.  The authors are solely responsible for the views expressed.    Goel-Korhonen 1 
 
 
Determinants of Economic Growth in BRIC Countries 
Abstract 
We study economic growth in four emerging economies - Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
(BRIC).  Questions addressed are: (a) How do medium term growth determinants differ from 
short term determinants? (b) What are differences between growth effects of aggregate versus 
disaggregated exports? And (c) Does lower institutional quality hinder growth? Results show 
that while BRIC nations have higher growth, there are significant within-group differences.  
China and Russia mostly showed higher growth, while India sometimes showed positive growth, 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
The causes of economic growth have intrigued economists and policymakers for quite some 
time.  Over time, numerous theories and empirical studies have been generated examining 
different aspects (for examples, see Solow (1956), Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992) and 
Romer (1990); and Aghion and Howitt (1997) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for review of 
the related literature).  Increased globalization in recent times has led to complex cross-country 
linkages affecting growth that are not easily captured.  Overall, while there is some consensus, 
numerous issues remain either contentious or unexplored (see Levine and Renelt (1992)).   
The present research focuses on the growth behavior of four leading emerging economies - 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC).  These nations are interesting studies due to their 
unique attributes.  Their growth success, especially of China, and growth potential have received 
considerable interest in recent years (see Wilson and Purushothaman (2003), Bird (2007), 
Fischer (n.d.) and Russia Analytical Digest (2011)).  Policymakers in other nations are interested 
in identifying components of growth in BRIC nations so that the success of BRIC nations can be 
replicated elsewhere.   BRIC nations are themselves interested in maintaining or even 
accelerating their growth.  However, formal growth investigations of BRIC countries have been 
few and the present research attempts to make a contribution in this regard. 
Even though the four countries in the BRIC group are clubbed, they are quite dissimilar in 
many respects.  There are significant differences in resource endowments and comparative 
advantages within the BRIC group.  For instance, China has been a huge growth success over the 
past two decades and significant causes of its growth can provide useful lessons for nations     Goel-Korhonen 3 
 
 
trying to emulate its growth success.  Brazil and Russia, on the other hand, are uniquely endowed 
with numerous natural resources which provide them useful growth ingredients.  Some research 
has focused on the resource-growth nexus (Leite and Weidmann (1999), Stevens (2003) and 
Kalyuzhnova et al. (2009)), although the context in which growth in the present study is being 
considered appears somewhat unique.  Russia is also a transition country and there are some 
unique issues associated with transition (Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000), Roland (2000), 
and Falcetti et al. (2005)).  Further, China, India and Russia have strong education systems 
ensuring a quality labor force and this can translate into higher economic growth.  India has 
comparative advantage in terms of a relatively large pool of English-speaking workforce that has 
translated into its success in information technology.  Further, geographically, all BRIC nations 
are among the largest nations in the world in terms of land area and are also the ones with many 
bordering neighbors.  Whereas, on the one hand, the geographic proximity can encourage trade, 
there can be potentially adverse effects due to illegal migration etc.   
We examine the differing growth determinants in BRIC countries in the context of a cross-
national study involving more than 100 nations.  We also move beyond the BRIC group by 
examining a broader set of highly growing nations and compare whether factors driving growth 
in these nations are substantially different from those for low growth nations. Thus, besides the 
primary focus of this study mentioned above, the size and the recent nature of the underlying 
data may be viewed as secondary contributions of this work.  As part of the exercise, a number 
of aspects are studied: (i) determinants of economic growth – medium-term versus short-term 
growth; (ii) the role of exports, both aggregated and disaggregated, in fostering economic 
growth, especially in BRIC countries (Feder (1983), Gylfason et al. (1999), Auty (2001) and 
Karras (2003)); (iii) the role of institutions in growth (Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (2003),     Goel-Korhonen 4 
 
 
Glaeser et al (2004), Boschini et al. (2007)); and (iv) possible reverse linkage between 
institutional quality and growth (Chong and Calderón (2000)).   
Within the context of the overall framework and focusing on BRIC countries, the 
following key questions will be answered:  
(a) How do determinants of medium term economic growth differ from those of short term 
growth?  
(b) What are the differences between the effects of aggregate versus disaggregated exports on 
growth? and 
(c) Is lower institutional quality necessarily an impediment to growth? The formal model 
follows. 
 
2.  MODEL AND DATA 
To arrive at a growth equation and to illustrate the theoretical background, one can start with 
a simple two-factor aggregate production function with capital (K) and labor (L), with Q 
denoting the aggregate output or GDP of a country (see Goel and Ram (1994)) 
Q = g(K, L)                    (1)  
Taking the total differential of both sides of (1) and rearranging, one can obtain a growth 
equation of the form:  
(dQ/Q) = ( Q/ K)(1/Q)dK + [( Q/ L)(L/Q)](dL/L)          (2)     Goel-Korhonen 5 
 
 
Here (dQ/Q) and (dL/L) are, respectively, the rates of growth in output and labor, [( Q/ L)(L/Q)] 
is the elasticity of output with respect to labor, ( Q/ K) is the marginal product of capital and dK 
is investment.   The labor and capital factors in (2) will be augmented by other factors in the 
estimated equations below.  Two significant aspects of this research deal with examining the 
linkages between various exports and growth and that between institutional quality and growth. 
The data include annual cross-country observations for more than one hundred countries 
for the year 2007 (or the closest year available).  Some of the right-hand side variables are taken 
with lagged values to make them somewhat predetermined and alleviate concerns about reverse 
feedbacks.
1  Within the context of this large sample, we try to determine if economic growth in 
BRIC countries has been somewhat unique.  We primarily focus on medium term growth over 
2000-2007 because this is the period that has mainly brought the BRIC nations’ growth in focus.  
The results for determinants of medium-term growth (GDPgr) are compared to those for short-
term growth dealing with a single year (2007), (GDPgrSR).  
  The growth equations estimated in this section facilitate comparisons with the extant 
literature, albeit with recent and somewhat different data.  Using the theoretical underpinnings of 
(2), we arrive at our estimation equation for medium-term growth baseline models 
GDPgri = f(GDPpci, GDIi, LABgri, EFi, EXPij, Brazil, China, India, Russia)  (3) 
                i =1,2,3… 
                j = AGexp, FLexp, MNexp, ORexp 
                                                             
1   The main reason for conducting a cross-sectional analysis is that some of the variables employed, most 
notably the available indices of cross-country corruption perceptions, are not readily amenable to time series 
interpretation.     Goel-Korhonen 6 
 
 
The growth relation in (3) is a variant of the endogenous growth theory.  The endogenous growth 
theory, due mainly to Romer (1990), states that nations might be able to affect their growth and 
that initial resource endowments matter (also see Aghion and Howitt (1997)).   
The dependent variable is the percentage growth in the per capita GDP of a country.  The 
primary focus is on examining growth in the medium-term from 2000 to 2007 (GDPgr).  This 
period roughly begins with the accelerated growth in the BRIC group and ends before the current 
financial crisis.  A one-year growth over 2006-2007 (GDPgrSR) is also taken to capture short-
term growth as a robustness check. 
Here GDI captures the investment mentioned in equation (2) above and LABgr is the 
growth in labor (annual average over 2000-2006).  GDI has generally been found to be a strong 
determinant of growth, whereas the effect of LABgr has been less clear.  There was considerable 
variation in GDI (for 2005; as % of GDP) within BRIC countries.  GDI in China and India (44% 
and 34.8%, respectively) was substantially greater than that in Russia and Brazil (20.1% and 
16.2%, respectively) 
EF is an index of economic freedom in a country.  Other things being the same, more 
economically free nations would be better able to use resources and exploit comparative 
advantages.  
The effect of initial GDP (GDPpc00) might be difficult to pinpoint a priori.  On the one 
hand, more prosperous nations might have the infrastructure in place to boost future growth; on 
the other hand, it might be relatively difficult to generate a higher percentage growth off an 
already substantial base.  The initial GDP also captures whether there is any trend towards     Goel-Korhonen 7 
 
 
economic convergence (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, pp. 44-50); also see Aghion and 
Howitt (1997)).   
The role of exports (EXP) in growth has been well recognized in the literature (see for 
example, Feder (1983)).  Further, the composition of exports might affect growth differently.  
For example, nations uniquely endowed with natural resources do not necessarily face similar 
competition in international export markets as nations with manufacturing exports do.  These 
differences could affect the relative growth impacts of the different export types.  To account for 
these issues, we include total exports as percentage of GDP (EXP); and a country’s share of 
exports in four major categories: agricultural exports (AGexp), fuel exports (FLexp), 
manufacturing exports (MNexp) and ore exports (ORexp). 
This issue is especially interesting in the case of the BRIC group as these countries have 
different but significant export capabilities.  Whereas the overall exports in both China and 
Russia (37.4% and 35.2%, respectively) and those in Brazil and India (15.1% and 19.9%, 
respectively) were similar in 2005, the composition of exports varies considerably.  For instance, 
China has emerged as a world power in manufacturing exports in recent decades, while Russia is 
a major player in a number of fuel export markets.  In 2005, fuel exports were merely 2.3% of 
merchandise exports in China, 6% in Brazil and 11.5% in India, while they were 61.8% in 
Russia.  On the other hand, in the same year, manufacturing exports ranged from 91.9% of 
merchandise exports in China to 18.9% in Russia.  Therefore, the relative growth effects of 
decomposed exports would be illustrative, especially in a study focusing on the BRIC group.     Goel-Korhonen 8 
 
 
A version of the baseline model adds institutional quality and literacy (EDU) as 
additional growth determinants. Other things being the same, higher quality labor, proxied by the 
literacy rate, would enhance growth (Barro (2001)).   
The quality of institutions in a country is crucial to economic growth.  Effective 
institutions correct market failures and lower transactions costs (see Mehlum et al. (2006)). 
Recognizing the difficulties with empirically measuring institutional quality, we employ three 
measures of institutional quality.  One is an index of corruption perceptions from the 
Transparency International (www.transparency.org), (CORR).  A high level of corruption would 
imply underdeveloped or inefficient institutions.  However, higher levels of corruption can have 
positive growth effects when it promotes efficiency (Lui (1985)).   As an alternate measure of 
institutional quality, we include an index of property or patent rights protection (IPP), due to 
Park (2008).  Other things being the same, a strong property right protection would imply good 
institutional quality that would bolster economic growth.  Finally, the effect of democracy 
(DEM) on economic growth is examined.  Democratic nations have freedom of press and other 
civil liberties.  These factors might enhance growth by protecting rights; on the other hand, 
growth in more democratic nations might go down as the equity-efficiency tradeoff is bent more 
towards equity.  In addition to the primary focus on BRIC nations, the relative comparison of 
alternate institutional quality measures may be viewed as a contribution of this research. 
Turning to the main focus of this study, dummy variables identifying Brazil, China, India and 
Russia are included to identify BRIC countries.  We also include a BRIC group dummy variable 
to see if as a group the BRIC countries performed differently from rest of the world.  A positive 
sign on the resulting coefficient would imply that, holding other factors constant, growth in these     Goel-Korhonen 9 
 
 
countries was greater.  In other words, in the sample of countries considered, growth in BRIC 
nations was somewhat unique. Details about the variables used, summary statistics and data 
sources are provided in Table 1. 
3.  RESULTS 
The results section first discusses the findings of baseline models that are then augmented to 
address the questions posed above. 
3.1 Determinants of Economic Growth in BRIC: Baseline Models  
The OLS estimation results of the baseline growth model are presented in Table 2.  The 
overall fit of these models is decent as shown by the R
2 that is at least 0.33.   
The effect of initial per capita GDP (GDPpc00) on medium term growth is consistently 
negative and statistically significant in the five models in Table 2.  With a higher initial GDP 
base it seems that a high GDP growth is hard to sustain.  The negative sign on GDPpc00 can be 
viewed as being consistent with the convergence hypothesis (for example see Sachs and Warner 
(1995)). 
As in other growth studies (see for example, Goel and Ram (1994) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004, pp. 531-32)), the effect of investment (GDI) on growth is positive and significant 
in a majority of cases.  In all models 2.1-2.4, a one percent increase in GDI (as percent of GDP), 
has a greater impact on growth than a one percent increase in overall exports.  Labor growth 
(LABgr) has a growth-retarding effect, as there might be issues with gainfully employing     Goel-Korhonen 10 
 
 
additional workers.  The effect of economic freedom (EF) is generally insignificant, but positive 
and statistically significant in Model 2.5.
2   
Aggregate exports (EXP) are shown to have a positive and significant growth effect 
throughout models 2.1-2.4.  This supports the notion that a country’s exports enable better 
resource utilization through comparative advantage exploitation and realization of scale 
economies.   
Upon disaggregating exports into four categories in Model 2.5, only manufacturing 
exports (MNexp) and fuel exports (FLexp) have positive and significant growth effects.  In terms 
of relative magnitudes, fuel exports have a larger positive impact on growth than a corresponding 
increase in manufacturing exports.  Unique resource endowments provide nations with 
comparative advantages and possibly larger markups that contribute significantly to growth. 
However, this is not consistently true across all exports, as the effects of agricultural (AGexp) 
and ore exports (ORexp) are statistically insignificant. 
To account for labor quality, Model 2.4 adds the degree of literacy (EDU) as an 
additional regressor.  The sample size in this case shrinks due to missing observations.  The 
resulting coefficient on literacy is positive and significant – as expected, better labor quality 
boosts growth. 
Turning to BRIC countries, two variations are considered: using a group dummy variable 
(BRIC in Models 2.2 and 2.5) and individual country dummies (Models 2.3 and 2.4).  The sign 
                                                             
2    Economic freedom may alternately be captured by a nation’s degree of openness to trade (measured as the 
ratio of exports and imports to GDP).  Prior research including openness as an explanatory variable in growth 
regressions has found the corresponding effect to be statistically insignificant (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, pp. 
529-30)).     Goel-Korhonen 11 
 
 
on the group dummy, BRIC, is positive in both instances suggesting that, other things being the 
same, economic growth in the BRIC group was higher over the 2000-2007 period.  However, the 
resulting coefficient is statistically significant only when aggregate exports are included (Model 
2.2). 
Of the BRIC countries, the coefficient on Russia was consistently positive and 
statistically significant.  China and India also showed positive growth effects, although the 
statistical significance was weak in one of the two instances in each case.  Interestingly, the 
coefficient on India attains statistical significance in the model that takes labor quality into 
account (Model 2.4).  On the other hand, Brazil did not show significant growth differences from 
the rest of the sample over the period 2000-2007.   Thus, while overall the BRIC group might 
seem to have grown significantly higher than rest of the world over the medium term, important 
within group differences persist. 
3.2 Institutional Quality and BRIC Economic Growth 
In this section we examine the role of institutions in fostering economic growth.  While it 
has been recognized for quite a long time that institutional quality can play a crucial role in 
economic growth, measurement of institutional quality remains a challenge.  To somewhat 
address this issue, we employ three different measures of institutional quality: the degree of 
corruption (CORR), the strength of patent rights (IPP) and the degree of democracy (DEM).
3  
Since these cross-country measures each come from a single source, they provide comparable 
benchmarks.  
                                                             
3    There are many proxies from institutions that one can choose from (see Knack and Keefer (2003)).  In line 
with the focus of the present study on BRIC nations, we limit our choice to three measures.     Goel-Korhonen 12 
 
 
Beginning with the seminal work of Mauro (1995), researchers have been drawn to the 
connection between cross-country growth and corruption (Bardhan (1997); Jain (2001) and 
Lambsdorff (2006) for related literature surveys; also see Mo (2001), Blackburn et al. (2006) and 
Aidt et al. (2008)).  The main premise is that corrupt acts create bottlenecks and are associated 
with unproductive transfers (Aidt (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).  Both of these factors 
retard growth and corruption control has been espoused by cross-national organizations as a 
condition for rapid economic growth.  However, the efficiency aspects of corruption, whereby 
corruption expedites governmental procedures, have also been recognized (Lui (1985), Méon 
and Sekkat (2005), Méon and Weill (2008)).  Thus the overall effect of corruption on growth 
would be determined by the relative strength of each effect.  In his authoritative review of the 
literature, Lambsdorff (2006) concludes that the “link between corruption and GDP or the 
growth of GDP has its empirical and theoretical weaknesses”, (p. 27) and that some results were 
“ambiguous”, (p. 25).  We contribute to the ongoing debate in this context by focusing on BRIC 
countries. 
We add the cross-country index of corruption perceptions (CORR) from the Transparency 
International to the estimated equation (3).  This index has been widely used in cross-country 
studies over the past decade and a half and provides fairly consistent data.
4    In our sample, 
Russia fared relatively worse in terms of corruption perceptions than other BRIC countries. 
However, all nations in the group fared worse than the sample average, suggesting that 
corruption was a significant problem.   
The degree of patent protection can be seen as capturing the role of institutions 
surrounding the protection of property rights.  The protection of intellectual property rights in 
                                                             
4    We performed a logistic transformation on the corruption index to unbind and to facilitate interpretation 
(see Table 1).     Goel-Korhonen 13 
 
 
BRIC nations has been the subject of some debate (Bird (2007)) and the present research will 
shed light on this aspect in the context of economic growth.  Democracy is related to institutions 
covering the freedom of press and civil liberties.  As discussed above, greater democracy would 
enhance growth when it fosters efficiency at the expense of equity and vice versa.  In the BRIC 
group, India has a longstanding tradition of democracy, while democratic institutions are in their 
infancy in Russia.  China is currently the least democratic nation of the BRIC group. 
Results from Table 3 show that, when institutional quality is taken into account, unlike 
Table 2, initial GDP and GDI do not have an appreciable impact on economic growth; while the 
results with respect to LABgr are similar.  Further, the effect of economic freedom is mixed.  
Aggregate exports again consistently boost economic growth and this finding is robust across 
alternate measures of institutional quality.
5 
With regard to institutional quality, greater corruption is shown to boost economic 
growth in both the models where it appears. The resulting coefficient is positive and significant.  
This result is consistent with the notion that corrupt practices might be boosting efficiency by 
acting as a grease to speed procedures and circumvent bottlenecks (see Méon and Weill (2008)).  
Thus, on growth grounds, corruption seems to fare well.  Whether such corruption turns out to be 
equitable is a different issue. 
When institutional quality is alternately measured by the degree of patent protection 
(IPP), the resulting coefficient fails to show any statistically significant effects.  Further, greater 
democracy (DEM) somewhat retarded economic growth.  Greater debate and attention to due 
                                                             
5    In consideration of some potential multicollinearity between exports and institutional quality (Leite and 
Weidmann (1999), Stevens (2003), Butle and Damania (2008)), Models 3.2 and 3.4 in Table 3 were run without 
EXP.  The main findings from Models 3.1 and 3.3 remained essentially unchanged.     Goel-Korhonen 14 
 
 
processes in democracies tend to lower growth relative to instances where solely efficiency 
aspects are emphasized.  This finding provides some justification for differences in the Chinese 
and Indian growth rates. 
Of the BRIC group, growth in China and Russia was higher in all instances whether 
institutional quality was measured by the degree of corruption or by the degree of patent 
protection.   The coefficient on India was positive in all cases, and statistically significant when 
patent protection was taken into account (Models 3.3 and 3.4).  Finally, the coefficient on Brazil 
was negative and statistically significant in one instance. 
In closing, it is possible that there is some reverse causality between institutional quality 
and growth (Chong and Calderón (2000), Glaeser et al. (2004)).  For instance, rapidly growing 
nations might have higher corruption.  In other words, bigger potential rents in fast growing 
economies might encourage bribe seekers.  Also, the degree of patent protection might be higher 
in high growth countries.  Finally economic growth might lead to development of democratic 
institutions.  This issue is addressed in section 3.3 below. 
   3.3 Possible simultaneity between Institutional Quality and Economic Growth 
As mentioned above, there might be simultaneity between institutional quality and 
growth whereby high growth countries might (i) invite more corrupt practices due to a bigger set 
of potential rents to be had; or (ii) have stronger patent protection.  Conversely, it is possible that 
low level corruption might be more prevalent in low growth nations due to poor monitoring 
systems and underdeveloped institutions.     Goel-Korhonen 15 
 
 
A two-stage least squares regression was estimated with CORR instrumented by the 
additional variables shown in relation (4).
6 
CORRi = h(ETHNICi, LANGi, RELIGi, GCONSi)           (4) 
                      i =1,2,3…  
The instruments for IPP and DEM, on the other hand, were 
IPPi, DEMi = h(ETHNICi, LANGi, RELIGi)            (5) 
                    i =1,2,3… 
ETHNIC, LANG, and RELIG are, respectively, indices of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalizations (see Paldam (2002) for study of their effect on corruption and Mauro (1995) 
for a related choice of instruments; also Alesina et al. (2003) for background on the calculation 
of fractionalization indices).  These socio-cultural differences might crucially affect attitudes 
towards corruption.   
Finally, GCONS is government size, capturing the size of the bureaucracy as well as the 
enforcement machinery (Rose-Ackerman (1999)).  More regulatory barriers provide 
opportunities for rent seeking, while stronger enforcement machinery increases the probability of 
detection.   
Table 4 reports (second-stage) 2SLS estimation results allowing for the endogeneity of 
the corruption and IPP variables in (5).   A Sargan overidentification test confirmed our choice 
of instruments.  The first-stage F-tests were also statistically significant. 
                                                             
6    Justifications for determinants of corruption can be found in Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (2006) and Treisman 
(2000).     Goel-Korhonen 16 
 
 
The overall fit of Model 4.1, endogenizing corruption seems relatively better than Models 
4.2 and 4.3.  The effect of initial GDPpc is statistically insignificant, that of LABgr is negative 
and significant, and of exports is positive and significant in both cases.  Both economic freedom 
and GDI positively impact growth in Model 4.1, but the corresponding coefficients are not 
consistently statistically significant in the other two cases. 
Turning to the influence of institutions after allowing for possible endogeneity, the results 
from Table 3 are reinforced.  Namely, greater corruption positively and significantly affects 
growth while the effects of patent protection and democracy are statistically insignificant.  The 
efficiency effect of corruption dominates the bottleneck effect in this case as well.  Finally, with 
respect to BRIC countries, China shows consistently positive and statistically significant effects, 
while that of Russia is positive and significant in one instance.  The coefficients on Brazil and 
India fail to attain statistical significance.  This shows that growth in China, and to some extent 
in Russia, has been remarkable. 
In sum, when possible reverse causality from corruption to growth is taken into account, 
the previous results regarding the relation between institutional quality and growth hold, while 
the effects of other influences are similar to earlier findings.  In addition to the robustness of our 
results across three measures of institutional quality and the inclusion of BRIC group versus 
individual country dummies, we consider another robustness check. 
3.4 Robustness Check 
We perform a robustness check to analyze the validity of our findings.  This deals with 
examining growth over a shorter time period.     Goel-Korhonen 17 
 
 
   3.4a Short Term versus Long Term Growth 
As a robustness check of our medium term growth model estimated in Table 2, we also 
examine determinants of short-term growth.  The general pattern of findings is similar when a 
short term growth model, explain economic growth over 2006-2007 period is estimated.  Two 
versions, with and without labor quality, are considered.  The corresponding results are presented 
in the Appendix.  As expected, the explanatory power is lower as many influences on growth 
take some time to have an effect.   In Model A.1 exports show a positive growth impact, while 
LABgr exhibits a negative effect.  The effects of other variables, while similar in signs to those in 
Table 2, were statistically insignificant.  In Model A.2, greater literacy is shown to pay growth 
dividends even over the short term, while GDPpc00 is now statistically significant.  The other 
variables failed to achieve statistical significance. 
Of the BRIC nations, China stood out, even more so than it did it Table 2.  It seems that 
Chinese growth might be even more remarkable over the short term.  The results for Brazil and 
India echoed those from earlier and Russia was statistically significant in one of the two cases. 
4  Concluding Remarks 
Using data for over 100 nations and employing a fairly standard growth model, this paper 
examines the determinants of economic growth in BRIC countries relative to rest of the world.  
The growth success of BRIC nations in recent years has intrigued policymakers and researchers 
in recent years.  However, little formal research exists that focuses on these countries, and this 
work makes a contribution in that regard. A number of questions are addressed:      Goel-Korhonen 18 
 
 
(a) How do determinants of medium term economic growth differ from those of 
short-term growth? We find that the general pattern of findings is unchanged over the medium 
and short term (Table 2 and Appendix).   Exports and literacy boost growth, while there is 
support for convergence and labor growth has perverse effects.  GDI has generally positive 
effects, while greater economic freedom shows little statistical significance.  The convergence 
hypothesis was supported.  BRIC countries as a group showed better growth than rest of the 
world.  However, important within group differences were found, with China and Russia mostly 
showing remarkable growth, India sometime showing positive growth and Brazil almost never 
standing out. 
(b) What are the differences between the effects of aggregate versus disaggregated 
exports on growth? While aggregate exports in most cases showed positive growth effects, the 
story was somewhat mixed when exports were disaggregated into four key categories: 
agricultural exports, fuel exports, manufacturing exports and ore exports (Table 2).  Both 
agricultural and ore exports consistently failed to show any statistically significant impacts on 
growth.  On the other hand, fuel and manufacturing exports exhibited positive growth effects.  
We further find that the growth dividends from fuel exports were almost double those from 
manufacturing exports.  Finally, our findings were unable to find support for the resource curse 
hypothesis (see Stevens (2003), Boschini et al. (2007), Bulte and Damania (2008)).   
(c) Is lower institutional quality necessarily an impediment to growth? We employed 
three measures of institutional quality: the degree of corruption, the degree of cross-country 
patent protection and the extent of democracy (Tables 3 and 4).   With respect to corruption, it 
turns out that the efficiency aspects of corruption overpowered any negative consequences     Goel-Korhonen 19 
 
 
resulting in positive association between growth rates and corruption.  In other words, the 
greasing effects are supported over the sanding aspects of corruption (see Méon and Sekkat 
(2005), Aidt (2009)).  Greater democracy lowered growth, suggesting that that efficiency 
considerations were somewhat compromised at the expense of equity issues.  The degree of 
patent protection, on the other hand, failed to exert any appreciable effect on growth.  Only 
corruption effect was significant after allowance was made for possible reverse linkages from 
economic growth to institutional quality. 
To sum up, while as a group the BRIC nations have shown higher growth than rest of the 
world, there are significant within group differences.  China and Russia mostly showed higher 
growth, ceteris paribus, while India showed positive growth in some cases.  On the other hand, 
we were unable to find Brazil performing better than the rest.  The main policy lesson from this 
is that, given the dissimilar composition of the BRIC group, the lessons for other nations looking 
to boost growth by emulating BRIC nations might be limited.  Such nations would have to pay 
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Variable Definitions, Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition 
(Mean; Std. dev.) 
Source 
GDPgr  GDP per capita growth, annual average 2000-
2007, (3.73%; 2.64) 
World Development Indicators 
GDPgrSR  GDP per capita growth, 2007, (4.76%; 3.78)  World Development Indicators 
GDI  Gross domestic investment (% of GDP), 2005, 
(23.53%; 6.42) 
World Development Indicators 
LABgr  Growth in labor force, annual average 2000-2006, 
(1.76%; 1.49) 
ILO LABORSTA Internet 
EAPEP v5 Economically 
Active Population Estimates 
and Projections 
EF  Economic Freedom in a country,  
(percent free), 2007, (62.95%; 9.78) 
www.heritage.org 
CORR  Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),  Transparency 
International, (higher value more corrupt), 2007, 
CORR=log((10-CPI)/CPI), (0.18; 1.09) 
www.transparency.org 
EDU  Literacy rate (percent of literate population above 
age 15), 2006, (82.65%; 18.87) 
World Development Indicators 
GDPpc00  GDP per capita in 2000 (PPP, in current intl. dollar 
units), ($10812.56; 10869.45) 
IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database, 2007 
EXP  Exports/GDP ratio , 2005, (46.44%; 32.41)  World Development Indicators 
AGexp  Agricultural exports (percent of merchandise 
exports), 2005, (3.84%; 7.07) 
World Development Indicators 
FLexp  Fuel exports (percent of merchandise exports), 
2005, (14.26%; 22.69) 
World Development Indicators 
MNexp  Manufacturing exports (percent of merchandise 
exports), 2005, (49.23%; 30.56) 
World Development Indicators 
ORexp  Ore and metal exports (percent of merchandise 
exports), 2005, (8.17%; 14.00) 
World Development Indicators 
DEM  Sum of a country’s political rights and civil 
liberties scores, 2007, (higher score, more 
democratic), (-5.72; 3.36) 
Freedom House     Goel-Korhonen 26 
 
 
IPP  Index of intellectual property (patent) rights, in 
natural logs, 2005, (higher value greater 
protection), (1.24; 0.26) 
Park (2008) 
Brazil  Dummy variable identifying Brazil   
China  Dummy variable identifying China   
India  Dummy variable identifying India   
Russia  Dummy variable identifying Russia   
BRIC  Dummy variable identifying the BRIC group   
ETHNIC  Ethnic fractionalization 
(0.42; 0.25) 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
LANG  Language fractionalization  
(0.36; 0.28) 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
RELIG  Religious fractionalization 
(0.44; 0.23)  
Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
GCONS  General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP), 2005, (15.64%; 5.52) 
World Development Indicators 
Note: All data are by country and by year. 






Determinants of Economic Growth in BRIC: Baseline Models 
(Dependent variable = GDPgr) 
  Model 2.1  Model 2.2  Model 2.3  Model 2.4  Model 2.5 
Log(GDPpc00)  -0.74** (2.6)  -0.80** (2.8)  -0.81** (2.8)  -1.01** (2.4)  -1.31** (3.4) 
GDI  0.12** (2.1)  0.11* (1.9)  0.11 (1.6)  0.10 (1.4)  0.19** (3.4) 
LABgr  -0.72** (3.9)  -0.71** (3.9)  -0.69** (3.7)  -0.53** (2.2)  -0.61** (3.3) 
EF  -0.03 (0.8)  -0.02 (0.5)  -0.01 (0.4)  -0.06 (0.9)  0.08** (2.2) 
EXP  0.02** (3.3)  0.02** (3.3)  0.02** (3.2)  0.03**  (2.1)   
EDU        0.06** (2.9)   
AGexp          -0.01 (0.6) 
FLexp          0.06** (3.0) 
MNexp            0.03** (2.5) 
ORexp           -0.01 (0.4) 
BRIC    1.76** (2.0)      1.12 (1.0) 
Brazil       0.16 (0.3)  -0.36 (0.6)   
China       2.79* (1.9)  2.09 (1.3)   
India       0.72 (0.8)  1.60* (1.7)   
Russia       3.54** (5.6)  2.30** (2.9)   
R
2  0.33  0.34  0.35  0.43  0.50 
N  114  114  114  77  90 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions.  A constant term was included in all OLS regressions but the 
corresponding results are not reported to conserve space.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute 
value based on robust standard errors.  * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level and ** denotes statistical 





Institutional Quality and BRIC Economic Growth 
(Dependent variable = GDPgr) 
  Model 3.1  Model 3.2  Model 3.3  Model 3.4  Model 3.5  Model 3.6 
Log(GDPpc00)  -0.31 (1.1)  -0.18 (0.6)  -0.27 (0.7)  -0.04 (0.1)  -0.35 (1.22)  -0.16 (0.5) 
GDI  0.09 (1.4)  0.10 (1.4)  0.01 (0.1)  0.01 (0.3)  0.10* (1.6)  0.11* (1.7) 
LABgr  -0.72** (4.1)  -0.66** (3.7)  -0.49** (2.6)  -0.46** (2.3)  -0.82** (4.4)  -0.82** (4.3) 
EF  0.06 (1.2)  0.09* (1.9)  -0.05* (1.8)  -0.22 (0.7)  0.004 (0.1)  0.02 (0.8) 
EXP  0.02** (3.3)    0.02** (4.2)    0.02** (2.0)   
CORR  1.18** (3.1)  1.25** (3.3)         
IPP      0.14 (0.1)  -0.98 (0.5)     
DEM          -0.29** (2.5)  -0.37** (3.3) 
Brazil  -0.19 (0.4)  -0.70 (1.2)  -0.66 (1.5)  -1.05** (2.1)  0.33 (0.6)  0.07 (0.1) 
China  3.58** (2.5)  3.54** (2.3)  5.30** (4.6)  5.68** (4.4)  0.93 (0.5)  0.35 (0.2) 
India  1.49 (1.6)  1.11 (1.2)  2.39** (3.0)  2.38** (2.7)  1.35 (1.6)  1.25 (1.5) 
Russia  3.04** (5.0)  3.18** (5.0)  3.26 ** (5.6)  3.57** (5.5)  1.81** (2.1)  1.45 (1.5) 
R
2  0.40  0.34  0.38  0.26  0.40  0.37 
N  114  114  94  94  114  114 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions.  A constant term was included in all OLS regressions but the 
corresponding results are not reported to conserve space.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute 
value based on robust standard errors.  * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level and ** denotes statistical 





Allowing for Endogeneity of Institutional Quality: IV Regressions 
(Dependent variable = GDPgr) 
  Model 4.1  Model 4.2  Model 4.3 
Log(GDPpc00)  0.22 (0.5)  -0.38 (0.3)  -0.39 (0.4) 
GDI  0.09** (2.4)  0.002 (0.1)  0.10** (2.8) 
LABgr  -0.74** (4.4)  -0.47* (1.9)  -0.81** (2.6) 
EF  0.16** (2.6)  -0.06 (1.0)  0.004 (0.1) 
EXP  0.02** (2.5)  0.02* (1.8)  0.02 (1.1) 
CORR  2.49** (2.9)      
IPP    0.84 (0.1)   
DEM      -0.28 (0.5) 
Brazil  -0.33 (0.2)  -0.69 (0.4)  0.31 (0.1) 
China  4.19* (1.8)  5.19* (1.9)  1.06 (0.2) 
India  2.15 (1.0)  2.25 (0.9)  1.33 (0.5) 
Russia  2.90 (1.3)  3.21* (1.8)  1.91 (0.5) 
F-value  6.9**  4.9**  5.9** 
N  112  93  113 




6.15 (0.10)  0.45 (0.80)  1.52 (0.47) 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions.  A constant term was included in all 2SLS regressions but the 
corresponding results are not reported to conserve space.  CORR was instrumented by ETHNIC, LANG, RELIG, 
and GCONS in Model 5.1; while IPP and DEM were instrumented by ETHNIC, LANG and RELIG in Models 5.2 
and 5.3, respectively.  The numbers in parentheses are (absolute) z-statistics of second-stage results.  * denotes 





Determinants of Economic Growth in BRIC: Short Term Growth 
(Dependent variable = GDPgrSR) 
  Model A.1  Model A.2 
Log(GDPpc00)  -0.59 (1.3)  -1.14** (2.1) 
GDI  0.05 (0.5)  0.03 (0.2) 
LABgr  -0.54* (1.9)  0.07 (0.2) 
EF  -0.08 (1.4)  -0.09 (0.9) 
EXP  0.03** (2.4)  0.03 (1.2) 
EDU    0.13** (4.4) 
Brazil  0.52 (0.6)  -0.24 (0.2) 
China  5.41** (2.2)  5.21* (1.9) 
India  2.03 (1.3)  4.67** (3.2) 
Russia  2.65** (2.8)  1.30 (1.0) 
R
2  0.18  0.33 
N  114  77 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions.  A constant term was included in all OLS regressions but the 
corresponding results are not reported to conserve space.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute 
value based on robust standard errors.  * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level and ** denotes statistical 
significance at least at the 5% level. 
 